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Abstract 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has rapidly increased in developing countries for the 1990s, but 
formal evidence for vertical FDI has been surprisingly mixed. This paper empirically reconsiders 
the factor-proportions hypothesis by exploring the role of host country’s relative skill 
endowments in offshore production of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Using panel data on 
sales of foreign affiliates by Japanese and U.S. MNEs in the 1990s, I find that relative skill 
abundance has a large negative impact on Japanese affiliate sales, but little effect on U.S. affiliate 
sales. Robust to a wide variety of sensitivity checks, the results strongly support vertical FDI in 
the case of Japanese MNEs, but not U.S. MNEs. Because the dominant view in favor of 
horizontal FDI against vertical FDI in the previous literature emerged primarily from U.S. data, I 
empirically demonstrate that data sources on MNEs partly explain weak evidence for vertical 
FDI.  
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1. Introduction 
The dramatic rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) is a prominent feature of economic 
globalization, as global FDI flows increased at a faster pace than international trade and income 
in recent decades. The global production of multinational enterprises (MNEs) accounted for an 
estimated 10% of world output in 2006, as measured by the value-added of all foreign affiliates as 
a share of the world GDP (UNCTAD, 2006). It is commonly viewed among trade economists that 
the rise of multinational activity has been driven partly by a vertical type of FDI that is motivated 
by low factor costs abroad. Accordingly, the factor-proportions models of international trade have 
been developed to explain why multinational firms establish production facilities in a low-wage 
country (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Markusen, 2002). 
A growing number of studies have examined the empirical implication that vertical FDI 
should arise when countries are different in relative factor endowments. Prior research, including 
Carr et al. (2001), Braconier et al. (2005a), and Davies (2008), shows that multinational activity is 
positively related to differences in relative skilled-labor abundance across countries, consistent 
with vertical FDI. In contrast, another set of research such as Brainard (1993, 1997), Markusen 
and Maskus (2001, 2002), and Blonigen et al. (2003), finds that multinational production is 
negatively correlated with relative skill differences. Their findings are limited to supporting 
horizontal FDI associated with market-access motives. Thus, econometric evidence for vertical 
FDI is mixed and even contradictory, leading to the dominant view that FDI activity is primarily 
horizontal. Despite the great interest in vertical fragmentation of production across borders, the 
empirical importance of the factor-seeking motive of multinational production remains largely 
inconclusive. 
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the factor-proportions explanation for FDI by 
investigating the relationship between offshore production of multinational firms and relative skill 
endowments of host countries. In this paper, I use panel data on sales of foreign affiliates by 
Japanese and U.S. MNEs for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000. A fairly consistent dataset on   2
foreign affiliate sales allows for comparative assessment on the vertical motive of FDI across 
Japanese and U.S. multinational production in the same set of host countries. Furthermore, this 
paper employs an instrumental-variables (IV) approach to address potential endogeneity of the 
host-country supply of skilled labor, which is likely to underestimate vertical FDI. For instance, 
developing countries may have an incentive to upgrade skill levels of the labor force in order to 
attract foreign investment. Specifically, I exploit differences in past schooling characteristics as 
instruments for the contemporaneous level of skilled-labor abundance measured by the 
educational attainment of the labor force. Thus, I carefully take into account the endogeneity of 
skilled-labor abundance to obtain a consistent estimate of the effect of skill endowments on 
multinational activity. 
Robust to a wide range of specifications and sensitivity checks, I find that skilled-labor 
abundance in foreign countries has a significantly negative impact on offshore production by 
Japanese MNEs. The benchmark results predict that the real sales of Japanese affiliates in 
manufacturing would decrease by 24.7% when the average years of schooling in host countries 
increase by one year. For example, if the labor force in China possessed the equivalent level of 
educational attainment as in the U.S. for the year 2000, Japanese affiliate sales in China would 
have been negative, conditional on observables. This suggests that Japanese FDI was strongly 
encouraged by the factor-cost motive. I also find that the IV estimates of the effect of relative 
skill abundance are larger in magnitude than the standard regression estimates, implying that the 
endogeneity produces an upward bias in the estimated impact of host-country skilled-labor on 
affiliate activities. 
In stark contrast to Japanese MNEs, host-country relative skill endowments have no 
significant effect on foreign affiliate sales by U.S. MNEs. Even after accounting for the 
endogeneity bias that may underestimate the importance of vertical FDI, the factor-proportions 
hypothesis is not supported in the U.S. sample. As host-country characteristics in the Japanese 
and U.S. samples are virtually identical, the different conclusions on the vertical motive of FDI   3
are due to the different patterns of Japanese and U.S. multinational production; U.S. affiliate 
activities are more concentrated in high-wage countries than Japanese affiliate activities. As 
compared to prior work, my analysis empirically demonstrates that the data source of 
multinational activity plays a central role in driving empirical evidence for vertical FDI. The 
implication is that the dominant view in favor of horizontal FDI in the previous literature could 
result partly from the wide availability of U.S. data on multinational firms. 
Section 2 reviews the related literature on vertical FDI. Section 3 discusses an empirical 
strategy in specification and estimation. Section 4 provides data descriptions of Japanese and U.S. 
MNE activity and host-country characteristics. Section 5 presents the estimation results with 
sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Literature on Vertical Foreign Direct Investment   
This section first provides a brief summary of the general-equilibrium approach to FDI 
to motivate the empirical literature on a vertical motive of multinational production. The 
theoretical literature has traditionally focused on two forms of multinational production.
1 Some 
firms fragment the production process vertically across borders. These firms are vertical MNEs 
that are headquartered in one country and produce in another country. Other firms establish an 
identical production process abroad. These firms are horizontal MNEs that maintain both 
headquarters and plant in one country and an additional plant in another country. Headquarters 
services such as management, R&D, and advertising play a key role in supporting the operation 
of both MNEs. 
A group of theoretical work such as Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985), 
and Markusen (2002) analyzes the role of factor-proportions differences in explaining the 
                                                   
1 Theoretical papers discussed here abstract from the ownership decision of offshore plants. See 
Helpman (2006) for a survey on international organization of production.   4
formation of vertical MNEs.
2  These models predict that offshore production by vertical MNEs is 
likely to arise when countries are sufficiently different in factor proportions. To illustrate, 
consider two countries endowed with skilled and unskilled labor. Multinational firms consist of 
headquarters services and manufacturing production, with headquarters more skilled-labor 
intensive than production. When countries are similar in relative skill endowments, cross-country 
differences in the relative price of skilled to unskilled labor is eliminated by international trade. 
There is no factor-cost incentive for firms in both countries to offshore a production plant.   
When one country becomes sufficiently skilled-labor abundant relative to another 
country, cross-border differentials in the relative skilled-labor cost is not equalized through 
foreign trade. As a result, factor-cost differentials create an incentive for firms in a relatively 
skilled-labor-abundant country to establish production facilities in a relatively skilled-labor-scarce 
country. Headquarters activity that uses skilled labor intensively is located in the country where 
skilled labor is relatively cheap. Production activity that employs unskilled labor intensively is 
moved to the country in which unskilled labor is relatively cheap. Consequently, vertical MNEs 
arise in a single direction to serve consumers at home via offshore production solely because of 
international differences in relative skill endowments. The supply of unskilled labor in the host 
country plays a crucial role in attracting vertical investment from the skilled-labor-abundant 
country.   
  Another set of theoretical work such as Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), and 
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000), explores a firm’s decision between exporting and local 
production in serving foreign markets to explain the formation of horizontal MNEs.
3 In contrast 
to vertical FDI, these models predict that horizontal FDI is likely to occur when countries are 
similar in relative skill endowments. In these models, a firm consists of a headquarters and a 
production plant at home. Factor intensities in headquarters and production activities are identical 
                                                   
2  Markusen (2002) combines both vertical and horizontal motives in the model, which is referred to as 
the knowledge-capital model.   
3  See Helpman et al. (2004) for the horizontal model that incorporates firm heterogeneity.     5
to rule out vertical fragmentation of production. The firm must decide whether to produce abroad 
or export by comparing transportation costs of exporting and a plant-specific fixed cost for local 
production. In the absence of factor-cost motives, horizontal MNEs will arise when gains from 
economizing on trade costs offset an additional fixed cost of opening an overseas plant. Therefore, 
the relative skill abundance in a host country provides no direct motive for horizontal FDI.
4 
  While market-access and factor-seeking motives are equally prominent reasons for FDI 
in theory, early empirical studies such as Brainard (1993, 1997), Ekholm (1998), Markusen and 
Maskus (2001, 2002), provide little support for vertical FDI, but strong evidence in favor of 
horizontal FDI. Brainard (1993, 1997) investigates the market-access and factor-proportions 
explanations of multinational production by exploring U.S. data on affiliate sales disaggregated 
by country and industry for 1989. She finds that trade costs increase affiliate sales both absolutely 
and relative to trade, but cross-country differentials in income per worker reduce affiliate 
activities. Ekholm (1998) provides similar evidence from country-level data on affiliate sales of 
Swedish multinationals in 1994. Furthermore, Markusen and Maskus (2001, 2002) explicitly test 
the vertical model against the horizontal model for U.S. data on affiliate sales at the country level 
for 1986-1994. They find that skilled-labor abundance in the host country increases both local and 
export sales by U.S. affiliates. These findings suggest that horizontal investment is far more 
important than vertical investment in accounting for aggregate multinational activity.       
  Aggregate multinational sales arise from both vertical and horizontal reasons for FDI 
that interact in a complex way. Based on the knowledge-capital model of horizontal and vertical 
MNEs, Carr et al. (2001) estimate an empirical specification that accounts for complex effects of 
country characteristics. Using the panel data as in Markusen and Maskus (2002), they find that 
affiliate production of U.S. firms is attracted to skilled-labor-abundant countries. Blonigen et al. 
(2003) estimate the modified empirical specification of Carr et al. for U.S. and OECD samples of 
                                                   
4 Markusen (2002) shows that factor-cost differentials indirectly discourage horizontal MNEs, 
because firms favor exporting over local production for sale in a high-cost market.   6
MNE activity with the larger country coverage. They show that absolute differences in relative 
skill endowments reduce affiliate and FDI activity. These results are also inconsistent with the 
factor-proportions explanation, even after controlling for horizontal reasons. 
In response to the dominant evidence for horizontal FDI, a growing number of empirical 
studies have taken various empirical strategies in search of vertical FDI. A set of empirical work 
attempts to resolve mixed evidence of the vertical part of the knowledge-capital model. Braconier 
et al. (2005a) and Davies (2008) modify the empirical specification of Carr et al. and enlarge the 
country coverage of the MNE data. While these studies provide some evidence for vertical MNEs, 
their results are sensitive in the sense that relative skill abundance has statistically insignificant 
effects on FDI activity in some specifications. Another empirical strategy is to directly measure 
international differences in unskilled labor costs. Braconier, Norbäck, and Urban (2005b) focus 
on cross-country differences in wage costs by skill level in explaining various affiliate activities 
of U.S. and Swedish multinationals for 1986-1994. They find that the various types of affiliate 
production are attracted to a low-wage country for unskilled labor. Hanson, Mataloni, and 
Slaughter (2005) study trade in intermediate inputs for further processing between foreign 
affiliates and their parent firms. Using a firm-level sample on U.S. multinationals in 1994, they 
show that affiliate demand for imported inputs is higher in a country with low unskilled-labor cost. 
While these findings accord with the factor-proportions implications, it is puzzling that both 
studies show a positive impact of host-country skilled-labor costs on affiliate activities.   
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) describe a wide range of affiliate activities 
from detailed information on U.S. multinationals for the years 1982, 1989, and 1998. They 
present the evidence that trade by foreign affiliates grew in specific countries (Canada and 
Mexico) and industries (machinery and electronics equipments) for the 1990s. Using a 1994 
sample on foreign affiliates by U.S. firms, Yeaple (2003) shows that multinational production in 
less-skill-intensive sectors is attracted to skilled-labor-scarce countries. These findings support 
the presence of comparative advantage motives for U.S. outward FDI. To extend the previous   7
work that concentrates on U.S. MNEs, Alfaro and Charlton (2007) use a global dataset on foreign 
subsidiaries in 90 countries and 400 industries. They define vertical FDI as a plant owned by a 
foreign firm that provides intermediate inputs to its parent firm, and horizontal FDI as a plant that 
belongs to the same product code as its parent firm.
5 They find that subsidiaries previously 
classified as horizontal FDI at the 2-digit industry level are in fact vertical FDI at the 4 digit level; 
foreign subsidiaries in the specialized input sector for their parents are prevalent in number across 
developed countries. However, they are not able to observe a trade link between affiliates and 
parents for a lack of information on affiliate exports. The subsidiaries defined as vertical FDI in 
their work could actually supply inputs primarily to local producers. In this case, offshore 
production arises for market-access, rather than factor-seeking, reasons. 
  This paper adds to the empirical literature in two ways. First, I combine country-level 
panel data on sales by foreign affiliates of Japanese parent firms with existing U.S. data. Offshore 
production by Japanese and U.S. MNEs, both of which are headquartered in large and skill 
abundant countries, are measured in a fairly consistent way. By using an identical group of host 
countries, this dataset allows for an international comparison on the importance of vertical FDI 
across Japanese and U.S. MNEs. Since influential papers such as Brainard, (1997), Carr et al. 
(2001), and Yeaple (2003) draw conclusions almost exclusively from U.S. data, my work 
provides an important check on possible influences of the U.S. data source in previous evidence 
against vertical FDI. 
Second, this paper improves an empirical strategy on factor-seeking FDI. While many 
of previous studies exploit a variation in skilled-labor abundance to estimate the factor-cost 
motive of multinational production, they have paid little attention to a possible bias of the 
estimated effects of relative skill endowments on MNE activity. It was often (implicitly) assumed 
                                                   
5  Based on the definition of industry classification, the subsidiaries that assemble final goods for 
export to their parents are likely to be in the same product code as the parents. Despite the vertical 
nature of such affiliate activity, these subsidiaries seem to be classified as horizontal FDI in their 
work.   8
that country-level skill endowments are measured with little error and exogenously determined to 
identify the parameters of interest. Apparently, there are a number of reasons to indicate the 
presence of possible bias in the previous estimates for the violation of the assumptions, which is 
discussed in section 3. Therefore, this study carefully takes into account the potential endogeneity 
of skill endowments in a host country by exploiting a variation in some measures of past 
schooling characteristics as an instrument for the contemporaneous level of educational 
attainment. 
 
3.  Empirical Framework 
3.1. Empirical Specification 
To analyze the factor-proportions theory, I adopt an empirical specification designed to 
estimate the knowledge-capital model in Carr et al. (2001). Their estimating equation is specified 
to explain affiliate production as a function of home- and host-country characteristics. While the 
specification includes differences in relative skill endowments to study a vertical motive of 
multinational activity, it must be modified to meet the nature of my dataset. Since my dataset has 
only two parent countries, Japan and the U.S., there is little variation in home-country relative 
skill endowments. Data on the host country account for the dominant variation in relative skill 
differences across countries. There is little advantage to consider parent-country skill endowments. 
Focusing on host country’s relative skill abundance, I estimate the following equation separately 
for the Japanese and U.S. samples with a host country i and year t: 
 
ASALEit = β0 + β1SKILLit + ηXit + ΣtγtTt + εit                                 ( 1 )  
 
ASALE is the real volume of aggregate sales by manufacturing affiliates in each host country, with 
more than 10 % of their equity stakes owned by parent firms in a home country. SKILL is the 
measure of the relative supply of skilled labor in each host country. X is a vector of independent 
variables that include important host-country characteristics in the investment decision by parent   9
firms. These variables serve to disentangle the effects of skill endowments on multinational 
production from potentially relevant determinants. Tt is a set of time fixed effects, with γt a vector 
of the coefficients. Finally, ε is an error term.   
  The purpose of this paper is to obtain an estimate of β1 in the estimating equation for 
data on Japanese and U.S. MNEs. The central hypothesis from the factor-proportions model of 
FDI is that if multinational production is motivated to take advantage of factor-price differentials 
across borders, then multinational firms would prefer to locate their offshore production in 
unskilled-labor-abundant countries. Labor-intensive stages of production such as final assembly 
are moved to a host country that has the lower cost of unskilled workers relative to skilled 
workers than does a parent country. This implies that affiliate sales should be negatively 
associated with the skilled-labor abundance in a host country. In other words, a negative sign of 
the estimate of β1 shows evidence for vertical FDI.   
The alternative hypothesis derived from the market-access explanation for FDI is that if 
multinationals invest abroad to obtain the access to foreign markets, then factor-cost differentials 
have no direct impact on the location of their offshore production. The formation of horizontal 
MNEs is driven not by labor-cost differentials, but by high trade barriers and the large market size. 
Affiliate sales should not be correlated with the host country’s relative skill endowments. In the 
case of multinationals from highly skill-abundant countries such as Japan and the U.S., a larger 
value of SKILL implies convergence in relative skill abundance across countries. Skilled-labor 
abundance could have a positive impact on affiliate sales if horizontal motives are present in data. 
Thus, a nonnegative sign of the estimate of β1 can be suggesting evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis in favor of horizontal FDI. 
  A set of independent variables, X, are included in equation (1) to control for the other 
attractiveness of the host market in the location of multinational production. Following Carr et al. 
(2001), I account for the variables such as GDP, MKP, DIST, TC, and IC. GDP is the level of real 
GDP in a host country. As firms prefer to locate offshore production in the large market for sale,   10
the predict sign for GDP is positive. MKP captures the potential opportunity to export to third 
markets from a foreign country. If the market potential attracts foreign firms as an 
export-platform base, MKP would have a positive impact on affiliate sales. On the other hand, if 
MKP simply reflects the attractiveness of neighboring markets relative to the host country, 
multinationals may avoid to locate production in the host country with large market potential. 
MKP would have a negative impact on affiliate sales. The expected sign of MKP is ambiguous.   
DIST is the geographic distance between capital cities in home and host countries. Since 
the distance is a proxy not only for transport costs between countries, but for information and 
monitoring costs on business operations in the foreign country, the expected sign of DIST is 
unclear. TC is inward trade cost for measuring trade barriers to imports in a host country. If the 
data are consistent with horizontal MNEs that economize on trading costs by overseas production, 
TC should have the positive sign. If the data are consistent with vertical MNEs that supply inputs 
to foreign assembly, TC should have the negative sign. The predicted sign of TC is not clear. 
Lastly, IC is investment cost to represent overall investment climate in a host country. As high 
investment barriers deter the entry of foreign firms to a host market, the predict sign of IC is 
negative. 
 
3.2.  Estimation  Strategy 
  The empirical model as specified in equation (1) allows me to disentangle the effects of 
relative skill endowments on multinational production from those of a wide variety of other 
country determinants. More precisely, regression analysis with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
provides an estimate of the coefficient of SKILL, conditional on observable factors such as market 
opportunities, trade barriers, and investment risk. This paper attempts to shed light on causal 
effects of skill endowments on multinational production by exploiting a variation in past 
schooling characteristics as an instrument for the contemporaneous level of host-country skill 
endowments. This estimation strategy is useful not only for obtaining a consistent estimate of the   11
coefficient of SKILL, but for reconsidering a potential bias in previous findings on vertical FDI.   
  Following the exposition of Wooldridge (2002), SKILL is an endogenous variable when 
SKILL is correlated with an error term in equation (1). Assuming that available data on relative 
skill endowments are generated independently from unobserved factors, many of previous 
empirical studies analyze the linkage between skilled-labor abundance and multinational activity. 
However, there are a host of reasons to suspect the possible violation of the assumption, which 
would lead to inconsistency in linear regression. First, reverse causality arises if the supply of 
skilled labor in a foreign country is affected partly by multinational activity. Slaughter (2002) 
illustrates several channels through which inward FDI can contribute to skill improvements in the 
developing countries. The growth of FDI activity since the late 1980s coincided with increased 
schooling in many developing countries (Barro and Lee, 2000), possibly suggesting an incentive 
effect of a perceived benefit of FDI on investment in human capital.   
Second, measurement error occurs when a proxy variable for skilled-labor abundance 
includes errors that are correlated with the proxy, but not with the unobserved SKILL variable. 
Given the tremendous difficulty in practice to make a distinction between skilled and unskilled 
workers both within and across countries, it follows that the available data for SKILL are likely to 
be measured with substantial errors. Attenuation bias from the measurement error can reduce the 
statistical significance of the coefficient of SKILL, which gives rise to bias in favor of horizontal 
FDI. Finally, omitted-variables bias appears when an error term contains additional variables that 
are correlated with SKILL. There may be unobserved forms of economic institutions such as a 
rule of law that create favorable investment climate for foreign investors as well as promote 
sound development of education systems. As a result, the estimated coefficient of SKILL can be 
biased upward. While it is difficult to pin down a crucial source of the endogeneity problem 
among others, it is reasonable to suspect that the SKILL variable suffers from any of possible 
forms of the endogeneity.   
  To solve the endogeneity problem, I employ the instrumental-variables (IV) estimation   12
with past schooling characteristics as a set of instruments for the current skill intensity of the 
labor force in a host country. Specifically, I estimate a reduced-form equation for SKILL as 
follows. 
SKILLit = δ0 + δ1PSCHOOLi, t-10 + δ2SSCHOOLi, t-10 + λXit + ΣtμtTt + vit            ( 2 )  
 
PSCHOOL and SSCHOOL are the average years of primary and secondary schooling of people 
over age 25 in the previous 10 years, respectively. In the first step, equation (2) is estimated with 
OLS to obtain the fitted value of SKILL. In the second step, SKILL in equation (1) is replaced 
with the fitted values of SKILL from the first step, and then the modified equation (1) is estimated 
with OLS to obtain a consistent estimate of the coefficient of SKILL  in the presence of the 
endogeneity  problem.      
  It is in order to discuss two key assumptions required to identify equation (1) with the 
IV estimator. First, at least one of the two instruments, PSCHOOL and SSCHOOL, must be 
sufficiently correlated with SKILL. Conceptually, it is reasonable that the relative supply of 
skilled labor in a country can be measured with the aggregate stock of human capital obtained 
through education, which is available for production activities by multinationals. If the average 
years of schooling are longer for the average adult individuals in one country than for those in 
another country, then the country is more skilled-labor abundant relative to another country. 
Given that human capital stock obtained at school represents the abundance of skilled labor, the 
past level of educational attainment of the population is the best predictor of the current level of 
educational attainment. Cross-country differences in the average length of schooling in the past 
period should be reasonably linked to differences in relative skill endowments across countries in 
the current period. 
Specifically, I employ the 10-year previous level of the average years of primary and 
secondary schooling for the contemporaneous level of the average years of schooling.
6 This 
                                                   
6  The 5-year previous level of primary and secondary schooling gives similar results.   13
indicates that if the average persons in one country have already spent a longer time at primary 
and secondary levels than those in another country this year, then the average length of schooling 
is likely to be longer in the country than in another country in 10 years. Thus, the choice of 
instruments is based on a conceptually valid link between schooling and SKILL. In addition, it is 
also crucial in empirical analysis to assess a correlation between the instruments and the 
potentially endogenous variable. Following Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), I examine 
instrument relevance by the partial R-squared measures and the F test of the joint significance of 
PSCHOOL and SSCHOOL in the first-stage regression. A high value of the partial R-squared and 
a low p-value of the F statistics would be evidence for the instrument relevance. 
  Second, a set of the instruments must be uncorrelated with an error term in equation (1). 
The exclusion restriction implied by IV regression is that educational attainment obtained at 
primary and secondary schools 10 years ago, conditional on the included control variables, have 
no impact on multinational activity this year. The instruments can have effects on affiliate sales 
only through skilled-labor endowments. A potential concern is that the past level of primary and 
secondary schooling of the population could be correlated with the current unobserved 
characteristics of the host country, which may have a significant direct effect on multinational 
activity. To the extent that other transmission channels could work, the IV estimate of the effects 
of SKILL on affiliate sales would capture partly an indirect effect of other determinants. Because 
the presence of the other transmission channels is not readily apparent, it is not conceptually 
possible to reject the unintended consequences of the concern about the exclusion restriction. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to assess the second criterion that the instruments are sufficiently 
irrelevant to an error term in equation (1) by testing overidentifying restrictions with the J statistic 
of Hansen (1982). Under the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term, the failure to reject the null would provide a check on the instrument irrelevance.   
 
   14
4.  Data Description 
4.1. Data on Foreign-Affiliate Activity of Japanese and U.S. firms 
To study a link between outward FDI and skill endowments, this paper uses data on 
foreign affiliates by Japanese and U.S. parent firms.
7 The data on Japanese affiliates are taken 
from the survey on overseas business activities of Japanese firms conducted annually by the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) in Japan. To examine the stylized facts on 
Japanese affiliate activities, the METI sends the survey questionnaire directly to the firms that are 
headquartered in Japan and own more than 10% of shares of the business enterprise in a foreign 
country. While the survey covers both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, it excludes 
parent firms in the finance, insurance, and real estate sectors. A wide variety of data items are 
included in the survey to measure foreign affiliate characteristics such as country and industry 
codes, sales and purchases by destination, and employment. 
While the METI survey provides detailed information on Japanese multinational 
activities, it has been recognized that the survey results suffer from low response rates of around 
60%, varying samples of parent firms over time, and widely fluctuating sales at the affiliate level. 
These issues result partly from the fact that reporting to the METI survey is not mandatory for 
parent firms. The publicly available data provided by the METI are neither sufficiently 
comparable to foreign-affiliate data from other country sources nor appropriate for rigorous 
econometric analysis. To overcome dirty data problems, I use the improved data of the METI 
survey from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI).
8 More  specifically, 
Matsuura (2004) exploits individual questionnaires reported by Japanese parent firms to construct 
panel data on affiliate sales, purchases, and employment at the foreign-affiliate level across 
countries and industries for the period 1989-2002. After identifying parent and affiliate firms, 
sector codes, and entry and exit of foreign affiliates in the data, he estimates the missing 
                                                   
7  Data on FDI flows and stocks are more widely available than affiliate data, but imperfect indicator 
of multinational production with which the factor-proportions hypothesis is concerned.         
8  The RIETI data are available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/database/d08.html.     15
observations by linear extrapolation for each affiliate. The RIETI provides public access to 
affiliate data aggregated by country, industry, and year.       
For comparison of foreign production by Japanese multinationals with that by U.S. 
multinationals, I exploit data on foreign affiliates of U.S. nonbank firms from the survey of U.S. 
direct investment abroad published by the U.S. Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA). 
Benchmark surveys are conducted every five years to obtain comprehensive data on all foreign 
affiliates of U.S. firms. While sample surveys in the non-benchmark years exempt small firms 
from filing a survey to reduce their reporting burden, the BEA keeps the affiliate coverage over 
time by estimating their affiliate activities. The BEA survey defines a foreign affiliate as an 
overseas business enterprise in which a single U.S. firm or person owns 10% or more of the 
voting securities. A foreign affiliate is assigned to the sector in which it has the largest percentage 
of its sales. The BEA provides a number of tabulations on various data items on foreign affiliates 
aggregated by country and industry.   
   This paper takes data on foreign affiliate sales from the RIETI and BEA. The data are 
aggregated over manufacturing sectors to the country level for exploring the relationship between 
manufacturing production by multinationals and unskilled-labor supply in a host country. Because 
affiliate sales are denominated in Japanese Yen for the RIETI data and in U.S. dollar for the BEA 
data, affiliate activities are not directly comparable across these data sources. Thus, Japanese 
affiliate sales are measured in millions of U.S. dollars using the average of Yen-dollar annual 
exchange rates in the 1989-2002 period, taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of 
the International Monetary Fund.
9 Another issue is that affiliate sales denominated in nominal 
U.S. dollars are influenced by annual inflation rates. A variation in affiliate sales includes both a 
change in the price level and a change in real economic activity of foreign affiliates. Thus, 
affiliate sales are measured in year 2000 U.S. dollars using a U.S. wholesale price index of IFS. 
                                                   
9  The period average of exchange rates is used to mitigate an influence from large annual movements 
in Yen-denominated value of one dollar.     16
Since the RIETI and BEA survey foreign affiliate activities in a similar way as to 
concepts and definitions, both datasets provide a fairly consistent measure of real manufacturing 
production of foreign subsidiaries by Japanese and U.S. MNEs. Compared to statistics on FDI 
flows and stocks, the affiliate data are much more appropriate for empirical analysis on the scale 
of the foreign operations of vertical MNEs as predicted by the factor-proportions models. 
However, it is also important to check practical consistency between the data sources. For this 
purpose, I compare real sales by Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the U.S. from the RIETI 
source with those from the U.S. BEA’s Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. Although 
the time-series plots show that Japanese affiliate sales are not identical between the RIETI and 
BEA data for the period 1989-2002, both data exhibit significantly similar movements in annual 
changes of affiliate sales, with a correlation coefficient of 0.93.
10 Thus, the result supports 
consistency across data sources on Japanese and U.S. multinational activities.     
 
4.2. Data on Host-country Characteristics 
  This paper explores the factor-proportions hypothesis in explaining the pattern of 
Japanese and U.S. multinational production. While there are various indicators of a country’s 
factor proportions such as capital, labor, and arable land, relative factor endowment is measured 
by the proportion of skilled labor in the total labor force. Skilled-labor abundance is previously 
used as a key variable to investigate the relative importance of vertical FDI relative to horizontal 
FDI. Since it is difficult to disentangle skilled labor from unskilled labor in each country, relative 
skilled-labor abundance is measured by the educational attainment from Barro and Lee (2000).
11 
                                                   
10  Although affiliate sales by the RIETI data are higher than those by the BEA data, a systematic 
difference appears to result from original survey methods. Specifically, BEA survey defines a foreign 
affiliate owned by a single U.S. firm whereas the METI survey defines a foreign affiliate owned either 
by a single Japanese firm or jointly by a Japanese parent firm and its other foreign affiliate. In addition, 
a foreign-affiliate’s industry is determined by sectoral sales of the affiliate in the BEA survey, but by 
subjective judgment of a person who files a report in the METI survey.     
11 Another data source is occupational employment statistics published by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO). However, the ILO data are less consistent for an international comparison because   17
Barro and Lee’s dataset is constructed by improving census/survey data on schooling from a 
number of countries in consistent methodology. An improved measure of human capital stock 
obtained through education with the wide country coverage is extensively used in the literature.   
Specifically, this paper measures skilled-labor abundance with the average years of 
schooling of people over age 25. However, the education data are available only for every 5 year 
over the period 1960-2000 whereas MNE data cover the period 1989-2002. The data availability 
forces me to exploit a variation in educational attainment across countries for the years 1990, 
1995, and 2000.
12  Additionally, I exploit previous schooling characteristics as instruments for the 
contemporaneous level of relative skill abundance. Data on past schooling are the average years 
of primary and secondary schooling of people over age 25 in the previous 10 years from Barro 
and Lee.     
The following data on host-country characteristics are also used. Data on real GDP 
measured in billions of year 2000 U.S. dollars are taken from the World Development 
Indicators.
13 Data on distance measured in kilometers between capital cities of home and host 
countries come from the International Trade Data website of Raymond Robertson (formerly 
maintained by Jon Haveman). For data on trade barriers, I use a survey index of national 
protectionism on imports from the World Competitiveness Report (the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook for 2000 data) by the International Institute of Management Development. The index 
ranges from zero to 100, with a higher number indicating greater perceived trade costs by 
corporate executives. Finally, data on investment risk in a country are obtained from Euromoney. 
The risk score is composed of 9 weighted individual scores on investment environment; political 
                                                                                                                                                         
some countries report employment in the 1968 International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO) and other countries in the 1988 ISCO. Occupational categories are defined in very different 
concepts across the schemes, and some countries even switch the reporting scheme in the period of my 
interest. 
12  Although annual levels in educational attainment can be created by linear interpolation between 
available years, this method provides little additional variation in skill endowment for regression 
analysis.   
13  Taiwan GDP data are taken from the Department of Commerce, Taiwan.   18
risk (25%), economic performance (25%), debt indicators (10%), debt in default or rescheduled 
(10%), credit ratings (10%), access to bank finance (5%), access to short-term finance (5%), 
access to capital markets (5%), and discount on forfaiting (5%), with higher scores indicating 
higher country risk. 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics of the Japanese and U.S. samples for regression 
analysis.
14 There are 110 and 98 observations for the Japanese and U.S. samples, respectively. 
The difference in the number of observations is partly due to the fact that the data cover 41 host 
countries for Japanese MNEs and 39 host countries for U.S. MNEs. The U.S. data do not include 
such countries as Greece, Hungary, and the U.S. for host countries of U.S. affiliates. The Japanese 
sample excludes Japan as a host country. Because the following results are not affected by 
including those countries in analysis, the larger samples are used to obtain more efficient 
estimates. The summary statistics clearly present two key characteristics of my dataset. First, the 
distribution of foreign affiliate sales is significantly different for Japanese and U.S. multinationals. 
Second, the host-country characteristics such as relative skill endowments, market size, and 
inward trade costs are almost identical across the Japanese and U.S. samples. These 
characteristics imply that any difference in descriptive and econometric analysis across the 
Japanese and U.S. samples will result primarily from the nature of foreign production by Japanese 
and U.S. MNEs. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
  Since affiliate data play a key role in the following results, I characterize a pattern of 
Japanese and U.S. multinational activity with box plots on foreign-affiliate sales for the years 
1990, 1995, and 2000. Figure 1 provides additional information on the distribution of affiliate 
                                                   
14  The Appendix contains a list of variable definition and data source, and a list of host countries.   19
sales to make comparison for an international pattern of Japanese and U.S. multinational activities. 
There are two prominent features in the figure. The first feature is the wide gap between the 
maximum and minimum volumes of Japanese affiliate sales, as compared to those of U.S. 
affiliate sales. This feature indicates that Japanese MNEs have the more dispersed presence of 
foreign production across countries than do U.S. MNEs. Second, the median values of the 
Japanese affiliate sales are smaller than those of the U.S. affiliate sales across the years, 
suggesting that the presence of Japanese MNEs in foreign markets is smaller than that of U.S. 
MNEs. In other words, U.S. multinationals maintain the deeper and more concentrated presence 
of foreign production than do Japanese MNEs.       
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Before proceeding with formal econometric analysis, I illustrate the cross-country 
pattern of multinational activity and relative skill endowments for Japanese and U.S. MNEs. 
Figures 2-4 presents a relationship between the natural logarithm of affiliate sales relative to GDP 
and the average years of schooling of the labor force for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000, 
respectively. Because the volume of multinational sales is strongly influenced by a scale effect of 
the country size, affiliate activity at the vertical axis is measured by the relative presence of 
affiliate production in the host economy. All of these figures clearly show a negative relationship 
between affiliate sales and educational attainment for the Japanese sample, but a positive 
relationship for the U.S. sample. These results indicate that affiliate sales by Japanese 
multinationals are relatively larger in more unskilled-labor-abundant countries, consistent with 
the empirical implication of the factor-proportions hypothesis on vertical MNE activity. In 
contrast, affiliate sales by U.S. multinationals are relatively larger in more skilled-labor-abundant 
countries, suggesting that foreign production by U.S. firms is attracted to skilled labor. Because 
the U.S. is one of the most skill abundant countries, the figures imply that U.S. multinational 
activity is larger when the U.S. and host countries are similar in relative skill endowments. Thus,   20
the U.S. data support the model of horizontal FDI in terms of relative endowments. 
 
[Figure 2-4 around here] 
 
  In sum, a simple correlation in the data suggests that Japanese firms may have invested 
abroad to take advantage of factor-cost differentials across countries whereas U.S. firms may not 
have established offshore production strongly for factor-cost motives. Evidence for vertical FDI is 
found in the case of Japanese MNEs, but not U.S. MNEs. It is worthwhile to note that the 
conclusion is drawn from using the share of affiliate sales in GDP levels as a measure of 
multinational activity. Defining the variable in such a way is almost equivalent to exploring the 
role of skill endowments in the cross-country pattern of affiliate sales after controlling for the 
market-size effects. Obviously, there are a number of other determinants of multinational activity 
such as trade barriers, investment climate, and government policy. The observed correlation 
between affiliate sales and education attainment may simply be confounded by omitted third 
factors. It is a task in the next section to disentangle the effects of skill endowments from other 
country determinants. 
 
5.  Estimation Results 
5.1. OLS Regression 
  Table 2 presents the results of OLS regression on the determinants of Japanese and U.S. 
multinational activity. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real volume of sales 
by manufacturing foreign affiliates of multinationals. The panel data used in estimation include 
the years 1990, 1995, and 2000 for the Japanese and U.S. samples. The panel dataset is 
unbalanced for missing observations of some of the independent variables.
15  Since  a 
                                                   
15  Trade cost in a host country has the slightly small country coverage in early years. While excluding 
the trade-cost variable from the model increases the host-country samples in regression, it is likely to 
introduce an omitted-variables bias in OLS estimates of the effects of skill endowments on MNE 
activity. As Carr et al. (2001) use the same survey measure for inward trade barriers, I choose the   21
Breusch-Pagan test for initial OLS regressions indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity, the 
following regression results report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
  Column (1) shows the OLS results for the sample on Japanese MNEs. As suggested by 
the descriptive analysis, OLS regression gives a significantly negative estimate of the coefficient 
of host-country skill endowments. This implies that foreign affiliate sales by Japanese firms are 
likely to decrease with skilled-labor abundance in host countries, conditional on the other 
observable determinants. In other words, the host country’s supply of unskilled-labor would 
encourage foreign production by Japanese MNEs, consistent with the prediction of the 
factor-proportions hypothesis. Because the skill-endowment variable is measured by the average 
years of schooling in the population for the dependent variable of the log of affiliate sales, the size 
of the coefficient implies that Japanese affiliate sales are predicted to decrease by 24.7% when the 
average person in a host country increases the schooling by one more year.
16 For instance, the 
average educational attainment for the year 2000 is around 6 years in China and 12 years in the 
U.S. If China had achieved 6 more years of schooling equivalent to the U.S. level, Japanese 
affiliate sales were predicted to decrease by whopping 148.2%. Since Japanese affiliates in China 
had their sales of about 28 billions in U.S. dollar, the calculation implies that the whole volume of 
their sales could have even disappeared in a ceteris paribus sense. 
  In contrast to the OLS results for Japanese MNEs, column (2) shows that the relative 
supply of skilled labor has a statistically insignificant coefficient in OLS specification. Any 
change in the host country’s abundance of skilled labor has no effect on foreign affiliate sales by 
U.S. firms. As briefly discussed in the literature review, an alternative explanation for the 
                                                                                                                                                         
possible loss of efficiency from overspecification instead of the possible bias of the estimates from 
underspecification. 
16  The marginal effect is computed by 100×(exp(-0.284)-1), which is equal to -24.7. Taking into 
account standard errors of the coefficient, the population parameter would range between -0.11 and 
-0.45 for 95% of the samples. This indicates that the marginal effect could lie between -10.4 to -36.2.           22
formation of MNE activity against vertical FDI is that horizontal MNEs arise when there are 
relatively large marginal costs in exporting and lower fixed costs in local production, suggesting 
no direct role of skill endowments in the location of affiliate production. The U.S. sample is 
consistent with these implications of horizontal FDI, but provides no support for vertical FDI. The 
OLS results for U.S. MNE activity also accord well with the previous findings such as Brainard 
(1997), Carr et al. (2001), and Blonigen et al. (2003). Using the BEA data on outward U.S. 
affiliate sales in the 1980s and early 1990s, these authors tend to find that U.S. multinationals are 
attracted to skilled-labor-abundant foreign countries. Since I extend the period coverage up to 
year 2000, my findings possibly imply that skill abundance became largely irrelevant for the 
location of more recent U.S. outward FDI. 
To statistically test a difference in the coefficients of skill endowments across Japanese 
and U.S. samples, I include the specification with interaction terms between independent 
variables and a dummy variable for Japanese MNEs, with the latter entering the model 
independently. For brevity, column (3) shows only the coefficients of the interaction terms from 
the new specification estimated with OLS for a pooled sample. As expected from the separate 
sample regressions, the coefficient of skill endowments in the Japanese sample is smaller by 0.3 
than that in the U.S. sample. The test for coefficient differences shows that host-country skill 
endowments have significantly different impacts on Japanese and U.S. affiliate sales. Combining 
with the results for the separate samples, it is suggested that Japanese multinationals prefer to 
locate offshore production in unskilled-labor-abundant countries more strongly than do U.S. 
multinationals. Although relative skill abundance has no significant influences on the location of 
U.S. multinational production, U.S. MNEs tend to locate overseas production in more 
skilled-labor-abundant countries as compared to Japanese MNEs.     
  Table 2 provides additional insights on important host-country characteristics for 
multinational production. GDP has the significantly positive coefficients for both Japanese and 
U.S. data. Offshore production by Japanese and U.S. multinationals is attracted to the large   23
market primarily for serving local consumers. Market potential has the significantly negative 
coefficient in the Japanese sample, indicating that Japanese MNEs tend to avoid the location with 
potentially large exporting opportunities from a host country. It may simply mean that if 
neighboring countries are relatively large in economic size, Japanese firms would establish 
foreign production in the neighboring countries. The coefficients of geographic distance are 
significantly negative for both Japanese and U.S. data. Multinationals prefer host countries close 
to their parent countries for various reasons such as information and transportation costs. Trade 
and investment costs have the negative coefficients, but the statistical significance varies across 
the samples. 
 
5.2. Instrumental Variables Regression 
  The empirical analysis up to this point has suggested that relative skill abundance in 
host countries is negatively correlated with Japanese affiliate sales, but has little association with 
U.S. affiliate sales. These findings are generally consistent with vertical FDI in the case of Japan 
and with horizontal FDI in the case of the U.S. However, as discussed in the estimation strategy, 
these results are not sufficient to conclude that host country’s unskilled labor plays a causal role in 
attracting Japanese affiliate activities. The causality link of skill endowments and affiliate 
production can break down for a number of econometric issues. A possible endogeneity of the 
SKILL variable in OLS regression is the major concern for analysis. Thus, this section addresses 
the endogeneity issue by exploiting cross-country differences in past schooling characteristics as 
instruments for the current skill endowments. If test statistics support instrument relevance for an 
endogenous variable and its irrelevance for an error term of the structural model, it is reasonable 
to interpret a significantly negative coefficient of SKILL as suggesting a causal effect of 
unskilled-labor abundance on MNE activity.         
  Table 3 presents the results of IV regression for Japanese and U.S. multinational activity. 
In the case of the Japanese sample, column (1) shows the second-stage regression for the equation   24
(1) that replaces SKILL with the fitted value of SKILL in the first-stage regression of column (2). 
The IV estimate of the coefficient of SKILL is significantly negative with the slightly larger 
absolute size of the coefficient as compared to the OLS estimate. Taking into account possible 
bias in the OLS estimate arising from the endogeneity problem, the IV regression suggests that 
skilled-labor endowments could have stronger negative impacts on Japanese affiliate sales than 
what implied by the OLS specification.   
To check the validity of the IV specification, the first-stage regression supports 
instrument relevance of the average years of primary and secondary schooling in the previous 10 
year. These instruments enter with high significance both individually and jointly in the first-stage 
regression. The partial R-squared of 0.88 strongly indicates a high correlation between the SKILL 
variable and the instruments. This implies that potential bias resulting from weak instruments is 
not a concern in the IV regression. In addition, instrument irrelevance in the structural equation is 
supported by the relatively small value of Hansen’s J statistics for the overidentification test. In 
other words, there is no strong evidence that the exogenous variables are correlated with the 
residuals from the second-stage regression. Thus, all of these findings lend considerable support 
to the conclusion that unskilled-labor abundance in host markets has the significant causality 
effect on offshore production by Japanese MNEs. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
  The IV regression for the U.S. sample is shown in columns (3) and (4). The IV estimate 
of the coefficient of SKILL is negative, but statistically insignificant. Compared to the OLS 
estimate, the IV estimate implies that the potential endogeneity of the SKILL variable has an 
upward pressure on the effect of host-country skill endowments on U.S. affiliate sales. 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that foreign unskilled-labor plays a role in the location of 
U.S. multinational activity. As the tests support instrument relevance in the Japanese sample, the 
instruments are highly correlated with the SKILL variable in the U.S. regression. In contrast, the   25
relatively large value of the Hansen’s J statistics does not show the absence of the endogeneity.   
However, the Hansen test needs to be interpreted with care. As discussed in Hayashi 
(2000, p. 218), the J test can be viewed as a specification test to examine whether the model 
restrictions are valid. To interpret the rejection of the J test as evidence for the endogeneity of the 
instruments, the underlying assumptions must hold with confidence. In addition, the finite-sample 
property of the test shows that it is likely to overrejcet the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of 
the instruments. In the small sample of my dataset, the J test could indicate correlation between 
the instruments and an error term even in the absence of the endogeneity problem. Thus, the 
overidentification test could imply a room for improving the specification in explaining the 
pattern of U.S. multinational production.   
 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Evidence in favor of vertical FDI has been provided with the descriptive statistics and 
regression results for the Japanese sample, but not for the U.S. While the major concern of the 
endogeneity of SKILL is already addressed by the IV estimation, the previous regressions could 
be sensitive to the empirical specification that is closely based on the knowledge-capital model. I 
introduce some alterations in the specification for robustness checks. 
First, the SKILL variable is defined in several ways for the model. Specifically, the 
SKILL variable measured by the average years of schooling is defined as the natural logarithm to 
mitigate possible outlier effects of top and bottom countries in educational attainment. The 
bottom countries such as Indonesia, India, and Brazil had the average 4 years of education in my 
sample. On the other hand, the duration of education was around 12 years for the top countries 
such as the U.S., New Zealand, and Canada. Table 4 reports the OLS and IV regressions for the 
modified specification. The columns (1) and (2) show the significantly negative estimates for the 
log of skill endowments in the case of Japan while the columns (7) and (8) give the insignificant 
coefficients in the case of the U.S. Thus, the results support the conclusion previously made.   26
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Next, it was controversial in prior work whether differences in relative skill 
endowments across countries should be defined as the absolute value (Blonigen et al, 2003). To 
check the issue, the SKILL variable is defined as the absolute difference in the average years of 
schooling between parent and host countries. Although there is little variation in parent-country 
relative skill endowments, the difference variable can serve to explore the implication that vertical 
FDI should be important when countries become more different in relative endowments. In the 
Japanese sample, the columns (3) and (4) present the significantly positive coefficients for the 
absolute skill difference. However, the columns (9) and (10) do not produce any significant 
coefficients for the U.S. sample. The findings imply that cross-country differences in relative 
skilled-labor abundance have a positive impact on affiliate sales by Japanese MNEs, but no 
effects on U.S. affiliate sales. While previous work on the knowledge-capital model focused on 
the specification of skill differences in resolving weak evidence for vertical FDI (Blonigen et al. 
2003; Carr et al. 2003), my findings indicate no prominent role of the absolute difference 
specification in the results. It is the data source that determines support for vertical FDI. 
Finally, skill endowments are measured by the percentage of college graduates in the 
population taken from Barro and Lee (2000). I exploit differences in the proportion of primary- 
and secondary-school graduates in the previous 10 years as the instruments for the college 
graduates. In the case of Japanese MNEs, the OLS result in column (5) shows that the 
college-graduates variable has the insignificant coefficient. However, the IV regression provides 
the significantly negative coefficient, possibly indicating that the endogeneity of the 
college-graduates variable has a strong upward bias in the OLS estimate. Consistent with the 
previous results, Japanese affiliate sales are smaller in the host countries with the greater share of 
highly educated workers in the labor force. In the case of the U.S. sample, columns (11) and (12) 
do not give any significant results. Therefore, my findings suggest that evidence for vertical FDI   27
is robust to the variable definition. 
  In addition to the sensitivity to the variable definition of SKILL, there is also the concern 
that the schooling instruments used in my analysis could have an effect on MNE activity through 
omitted variables, other than current skill endowments. To some extent, the concern is mitigated 
by the absence of evidence by J statistic for a correlation between the independent variables and 
the error term in the case of Japanese MNEs. Nevertheless, the failure to find evidence does not 
necessarily ensure that there are no other transmission channels through which past schooling 
characteristics could affect current MNE production.   
It is useful to assess the validity of IV regressions to the endogeneity resulting from 
potential omitted-variables bias. To this end, I largely expand the specification with the following 
variables. First, data on the average corporate tax rates are taken from the University of Michigan 
World Tax Database to account for the tax effects on the location of multinational production. The 
database reports statutory corporate income tax rates that measure maximum marginal tax rates 
faced by companies in each country.
17 Second, there may be regional effects on the location of 
MNE production, which could be correlated with the past schooling characteristics. I exploit data 
from the World Trade Organization to construct an indicator for 3 regional trade agreements: EU, 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and Mercosur.
18  Lastly, I control for the geographic contiguity 
and common language, which are specific to the U.S. sample. The data on common language 
come from the International Trade Data website of Raymond Robertson. 
  Table 5 presents the OLS and IV results for the largely expanded specification with 
Japanese and U.S. data on affiliate sales. In the case of Japanese MNEs, column (1) shows that 
the OLS estimate of the coefficient of SKILL is significantly negative with the larger absolute 
magnitude as compared to the OLS estimate obtained from the original specification. Since AFTA 
                                                   
17 Available  at  http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm 
18 The European Union (EU) was formed when the Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 1992 
and entered into force in November 1993. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was signed in 
January 1992 and came into force in January 1993. The Common Market of the South (Mercosur) 
began when the Treaty of Asunción was signed in March 1991.   28
has the significantly positive coefficient among the additional control variables, the previous OLS 
regression might have assigned the effects of ASEAN FTA to those of skill endowments on 
affiliate sales. The IV regression in column (3) also shows an increase in the absolute size of the 
coefficient of SKILL. On the other hand, columns (2) and (4) indicate that skill endowments have 
no significant effect on U.S. affiliate sales, even after accounting for additional control variables 
that could give rise to an upward bias in the coefficients of SKILL.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
A possible explanation for the upward endogeneity bias is that the past improvement in 
educational attainment at the primary- and secondary-school levels has generally a beneficial 
effect on economic growth, which strengthens an incentive for further institutional changes to 
increase economic gains. Reforms in economic institutions such as administrative procedures, 
investment rules, and regulatory frameworks could have a positive effect on multinational activity 
through a reduction in business costs. If the positive effects of institutional upgrading through 
past developments in the educational attainment are excluded from the IV specification, they 
could enter the negative effects of the current skill endowments on Japanese MNE activity, giving 
rise to an upward pressure on the estimates of ceteris paribus effects of SKILL. These arguments 
imply that the regression analysis tends to downplay the role of host country’s unskilled labor on 
multinational production because the better schooling characteristics in the past period can be 
likely to contribute to preferable, rather than deteriorating, investment environments for current 
MNE activity.     
 
6.  Conclusion 
A recent increase in FDI flows is commonly viewed as arising from vertical 
fragmentation of a firm’s production process to take advantage of factor-cost differentials across 
countries. General equilibrium approach to vertical FDI predicts that vertical MNEs should locate   29
unskilled-labor-intensive production in unskilled-labor-abundant countries. Contrary to the 
theoretical insight, formal evidence for vertical FDI was surprisingly mixed. This paper 
reconsiders the factor-proportions explanation by using panel data on sales of foreign affiliates by 
Japanese and U.S. multinationals for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000. Robust to a wide variety of 
sensitivity checks and endogeneity bias, I find that Japanese affiliate sales are larger in relatively 
unskilled-labor-abundant countries. One of the conservative estimates predicts that Japanese 
affiliate sales increase by about 25% when the average years of schooling of the host-country 
labor force decrease by one year. On the other hand, there is no evidence that host-country skill 
endowments influence U.S. affiliate sales. Thus, my analysis provides strong evidence for 
factor-seeking FDI in the case of Japanese MNEs, but not U.S. MNEs. 
The empirical results on the linkage between relative skill endowments and 
multinational production emerge after carefully controlling for affiliate-data consistency, a variety 
of host-country characteristics, and endogeneity bias. A distinctive pattern of Japanese and U.S. 
multinational sales is a crucial source in driving the opposite support for vertical FDI. Since 
previous empirical work in favor of horizontal FDI tends to focus on U.S. affiliate data, my 
analysis empirically demonstrate that the data source on multinational activity may play a large 
role in explaining weak evidence for vertical FDI in the literature. In this sense, my work 
highlights the importance of an international comparison on the determinants of multinational 
activity. Additionally, my findings raise a question of why vertical FDI is stronger for Japanese 
MNEs than U.S. MNEs. While a large number of comparative studies on Japanese and U.S. firms 
exist, this paper’s findings call for further comparative research in the context of vertical FDI 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics         
    No. of observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Variables Japan  U.S.  Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S.  Japan  U.S.
ASALE  110  98  7.90 9.50 2.14 1.40 1.32 6.45    12.3    12.2 
SKILL  110  98  7.99 7.85 2.24 2.14 3.30 3.30    12.2    11.5 
PSCHOOL  110  98  4.52 4.40 1.40 1.30 1.92 1.92    7.66    7.66 
SSCHOOL  110  98  2.20 2.14 1.24 1.15 0.45 0.45    5.09    5.08 
GDP  110  98  5.44 5.53 1.13 1.08 3.65 3.78    9.19    8.47 
MKP  110  98  1.86 1.83 0.66 0.67 0.61 0.61    3.32    3.32 
DIST  110  98  8.96 8.97 0.58 0.61 7.05 6.60    9.82    9.70 
TC  110  98  31.4 32.7 12.1 12.5 10.0 10.0    64.4    64.8 
IC  110  98  23.1 23.0 15.5 15.6 2.17 2.17    61.5    61.5 
 
 
Table 2. OLS Regression for Determinants of Japanese and U.S. Multinational Activity 







 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Skill Endowments  -0.284
*** 0.013 -0.297
** 
 (0.084)  (0.061)  (0.103) 
Log of GDP  1.097
*** 0.899
*** 0.198 
 (0.127)  (0.099)  (0.161) 
Log of Market Potential  -1.102
*** -0.121 -0.981
** 
 (0.247)  (0.170)  (0.301) 




 (0.207)  (0.125)  (0.242) 
Trade Cost  -0.020  -0.022
** 0.002 
 (0.017)  (0.008)  (0.019) 
Investment Cost  -0.037
* -0.013 -0.024 
 (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.018) 
Year 1995 Dummy  -0.215  0.153  -0.368 
 (0.372)  (0.223)  (0.434) 
Year 2000 Dummy  0.344  0.216  0.128 
 (0.386)  (0.261)  (0.467) 
No. of Observations  110  98  208 
R
2 0.525  0.667  0.635 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * indicating the 1, 
5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. Column (3) shows OLS estimates of interaction terms 
between regressors and a dummy variable for Japanese MNE in the specification including the interactions 
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Table 3. IV Regression for Determinants of Japanese and U.S. Multinational Activity 
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Sales by Manufacturing Foreign Affiliates 
 Japanese  Sample  U.S.  Sample 
 2
nd stage  1
st stage  2
nd stage  1
st stage 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Skill Endowments  -0.299
***   -0.035   
 (0.082)    (0.064)   
Log of GDP  1.099
*** 0.032 0.889
*** -0.108 
 (0.122)  (0.062)  (0.095)  (0.068) 




 (0.237)  (0.105)  (0.164)  (0.101) 




 (0.197)  (0.121)  (0.126)  (0.115) 
Trade Cost  -0.020  -0.009  -0.022
** 0.001 
 (0.016)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Investment Cost  -0.038
** -0.010  -0.019  -0.022
** 
 (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Year 1995 Dummy  -0.214  0.191  0.140  0.161 
 (0.356)  (0.152)  (0.212)  (0.167) 
Year 2000 Dummy  0.351  0.131  0.270  0.311 
 (0.375)  (0.160)  (0.257)  (0.163) 
Primary School (t-10)    0.947
***  0.923
*** 
   (0.042)    (0.053) 
Secondary School (t-10)    0.901
***  0.885
*** 
   (0.068)    (0.078) 
No. of Observations  110  110  98  98 
R
2   0.931    0.924 
Partial R
2   0.886    0.846 
F statistics for   












Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * indicating the 1, 
5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. A constant term is not reported. The null hypothesis for 
F test is that the instruments jointly have zero coefficients. The null for Hansen’s J statistics is that the 
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Table 4. Sensitivity to Alternative Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Sales by Manufacturing Foreign Affiliates 
  Japanese Sample  U.S. Sample 
Estimation  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 












    
Absolute Skill 
Difference 






















Observations  110 110 110 110 110 110  98  98  98  98  98  98 
R
2  0.52  0.51  0.47  0.67  0.66  0.67  














 2.43  3.29  2.04  6.44  6.19  0.03 
 (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.85) 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * indicating the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
GDP, MKP, DIST, TC, IC, year dummies, and a constant term are included, but not reported. The null hypothesis for F test is that the instruments jointly have 
zero coefficients. The null hypothesis for Hansen J statistics is that the instruments are uncorrelated with an error term. P-values are in parentheses for these 
statistics. College graduates are measured by the percentage of higher school completion in the total population, with the instruments of the percentage of 
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Table 5. Sensitivity to Additional Control Variables 









Estimation OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Skill Endowment  -0.307
*** -0.037  -0.319
*** -0.073 
 (0.083)  (0.080)  (0.077)  (0.073) 





 (0.146)  (0.131)  (0.136)  (0.117) 
Log of Market Potential  -0.596
* 0.254  -0.591
* 0.276 
 (0.283)  (0.225)  (0.264)  (0.208) 
Log of Distance  -1.074
*** -0.234  -1.078
*** -0.226 
 (0.230)  (0.325)  (0.213)  (0.294) 





 (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.010) 
Investment Cost  -0.042
** -0.017  -0.043
** -0.021 
 (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Year 1995 Dummy  -0.413  -0.155 -0.402 -0.143 
 (0.445)  (0.256)  (0.411)  (0.235) 
Year 2000 Dummy  -0.148  -0.147 -0.133 -0.098 
 (0.413)  (0.281)  (0.383)  (0.260) 
Corporate Tax Rate  -0.023  0.004  -0.023  0.004 
 (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.015) 





 (0.398)  (0.384)  (0.370)  (0.359) 
Mercosur 0.170  0.758  0.172  0.795 
 (0.485)  (0.470)  (0.446)  (0.419) 
EU Single Market  -1.203
* -0.221  -1.231
* -0.287 
 (0.511)  (0.380)  (0.479)  (0.347) 
Geographic  Contiguity    0.563  0.592 
   (0.658)    (0.588) 
Common  Language    0.397  0.438 
   (0.261)    (0.246) 
Observations 94  83  94  83 
R
2 0.661  0.725     
F statistics for   
IV Relevance Test 




Hansen’s J statistics for 
Overidentification Test 
   1.151  3.849 
   (0.283)  (0.049) 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * indicating the 1, 
5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. A constant term is not reported. The null hypothesis for 
F test is that the instruments jointly have zero coefficients. The null hypothesis for Hansen J statistics is that 





























1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
Source: RIETI and BEA
By Year and Home Country















































































Average Years of Schooling
Source: RIETI, BEA, and Barro and Lee(2000)
Note: Asale and GDP are measured in billions of U.S. dollars.
By Home Country
Figure 2. Affiliate Sales and Relative Skill Endowments for Year 1990
 
 



























































































Average Years of Schooling
Source: RIETI, BEA, and Barro and Lee(2000)
Note: Asale and GDP are measured in billions of U.S. dollars.
By Home Country






























































































Average Years of Schooling
Source: RIETI, BEA, and Barro and Lee(2000)
Note: Asale and GDP are measured in billions of U.S. dollars.
By Home Country
Figure 4. Affiliate Sales and Relative Skill Endowments for Year 2000
 
 




Table A1: Variable Definition and Data Source   
Variable Definition  Source 
ASALE  Log of aggregate sales of all manufacturing 
affiliates in each country measured in year 
2000 U.S. dollars, using IFS data on a U.S. 
wholesale price index and the period 
1989-2002 average of yen/dollar exchange 
rates 
Japanese affiliate data from 
the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry; 
U.S. affiliate data from Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce 
SKILL  Average years of schooling of people over 
age 25 
Barro and Lee (2000)  PSCHOOL  Average years of primary schooling of 
people over age 25 in the previous 10 years 
SSCHOOL  Average years of secondary schooling of 
people over age 25 in the previous 10 years 
GDP  Log of real GDP in billions of year 2000 
U.S. dollars  World Development Indicator  MKP  Log of sum of distance-weighted GDP 
levels of all markets excluding host GDP 
DIST  Log of distance in kilometers between 
capital cities in home and host countries  Raymond Robertson Website 
TC  Ordinal index of protectionism, ranging 
from 0 to 100 
World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 
IC  Ordinal index of overall country risk, 
ranging from 0 to 100; overall risk score 
consists of 9 weighted individual scores 
including political risk (25%), economic 
performance (25%), debt indicators (10%), 
debt in default or rescheduled (10%), credit 
ratings (10%), access to bank finance (5%), 
access to short-term finance (5%), access to 
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Table A2: Country List and Code    
Country Code  Sample  Country  Code  Sample 
Argentina ARG  (JP,  US)  Japan  JPN  (    ,  US) 
Australia  AUS  (JP, US)  Malaysia  MYS  (JP, US) 
Austria  AUT  (JP, US)  Mexico  MEX  (JP, US) 
Belgium  BEL  (JP, US)  Netherlands  NLD  (JP, US) 
Brazil  BRA  (JP, US)  New Zealand  NZL  (JP, US) 
Canada  CAN  (JP, US)  Norway  NOR  (JP, US) 
Chile  CHL  (JP, US)  Philippines  PHL  (JP, US) 
China  CHN  (JP, US)  Poland  POL  (JP, US) 
Colombia  COL  (JP, US)  Portugal  PRT  (JP, US) 
Denmark  DNK  (JP, US)  Singapore  SGP  (JP, US) 
Finland  FIN  (JP, US)  South Africa  ZAF  (JP, US) 
France  FRA  (JP, US)  South Korea  KOR  (JP, US) 
Germany  DEU  (JP, US)  Spain  ESP  (JP, US) 
Greece GRC  (JP,      )  Sweden  SWE  (JP,  US) 
Hong Kong  HKG  (JP, US)  Switzerland  CHE  (JP, US) 
Hungary HUN  (JP,      )  Taiwan  TWN  (JP,  US) 
India  IND  (JP, US)  Thailand  THA  (JP, US) 
Indonesia  IDN  (JP, US)  Turkey  TUR  (JP, US) 
Ireland  IRL  (JP, US)  United Kingdom  GBR  (JP, US) 
Israel  ISR  (JP, US)  United States  USA  (JP,      ) 
Italy  ITA  (JP, US)  Venezuela  VEN  (JP, US) 
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